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Abstract
The United States Mariner Mars 1971 Program was planned to place
two planetary vehicles in Martian orbit to obtain scientific measure-
ments of the physical characteristics of the planets. To assure that
Mars will be maintained as a biological preserve, the probability of
contaminating the planet with viah'4 terrestrial microorganisms
from the launch vehicle or the spacecraft has been analyzed.
This raper describes the analysis approach and the planetary quaran-
tine model being applied to the program for allocating and estimating
the probability of contamination associated with potential biological
contamination sources. It is shown that three sources — accidental
impact of the spacecraft,, loose particles, and gases used for attitude
control and pressurization — form the major hazards. Furthermore,
the results of the analysis indicate that with the planned mission
This paper presents the results of one phase of research carried out at
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, under
Contract No. NAS 7-100, sponsored by the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration.
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strategy, including aiming point and delivery biases, an y! the
imposition of facility and procedural control during the sof *,,
	 test
operations to minimize particulate and microbial contamination of
the spacecraft, the planetary quarantine constraints for the Mariner
Mars 1971 mission are being satisfied.
1.	 Introduction
The United States' concern for the biological preservation of the
planets,in consonance with the Committee on Space Research
(COSPAR) agreements and the Outer Space Treaty [1], necessitated
the development of planetary quarantine requirements, policies, and
approaches for planetary flight programs (2]. This digest will
identify the considerations and approaches that are used for the
Mariner Mars 1971 orbital mission to assure concerned organiza-
tions that the United States is pursuing an active planetary quarantine
program.
The United States policy is established by the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA), following the recommendations of
the Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences. The
I , ',	 objective of the NASA policies is to prevent the transfer of terres-
trial life to the planets of biological interest so that life detection
experiments will not be invalidated and the planet's environment will
not be irreversibly altered. The Planetary Quarantine Office of
NASA implements national policy for unmanned planetary missions
by means of a planetary quarantine document (3) that requires all
flight projects to demonstrate compliance with specified quarantine
constraints before launch approval is granted.
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Each planetary project performs an analysis to show that the
probability of contamination associated with a flight will be less than
a specified value. The value specified by the Planetary Quarantine
Office for each mission is established from the planet contamination
constraint accepted from COSPAR, which is based on the estimated
number of missions to that planet to be conducted during the period
of biological interest, the proportion of United States launches, and
the apportionment of the total constraint against the various types of
missions (i. e. , lander, orbiter, fly-by). The mission allocation for
Mariner Mars 1971 is 7.1 X 10- 5.
In performing the planetary quarantine analysis, the project utilizes
NASA directives, provisions, and standards. Among the latter is a
value for probability of growth and proliferation for any microorga-
nisms reaching Mars, PG
 = 10-4.
2.	 Mission Profile
The primary objective of the Mariner Mars 1971 Project is to insert
spacecraft into orbit about Mars to obtain scientific information
about the pianot and its environment, and to make exploratory inves-
tigations that will form the basis for future experiments, specifically
those relevant to the search for extraterrestrial life. The Mariner
Mars 1971 spacecraft was launched by an Atlas Centaur launch
vehicle from Cape Kennedy. Flight time to Mars is 168 days.
f
The mission profile for the Mariner Mars 1971 Program is given in
Fig. 1. The mission profile can be defined in two segments, the
heliocentric and the areocentric. The heliocentric portion of the
4.
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mission is from injection to, but not including, orbit insertion. The
areocentric portion takes place after and including orbit insertion.
3.	 Planetary Quarantine Model and Analysis
From the mission profile and from a flight sequence of events, all
potential contaminating sources are identified. A planetary quaran-
tine model (Fig. 2) is then determined. This probability "tree" per-
mits estimation of constraint levels as it relates to each identified
source. Confirmation that these estimates will not be exceeded is
obtained by performing an analysis utilizing information from prior
flight experience, literature surveys, experimentation, and engi-
neering judgment. The results of this analysis are used for select-
ing appropriate mission strategies, i. e. , aiming point biasing and
orbit periapsis altitude F lection.
Two categories of contamination sources are identified, namely
large impactable sources and ejecta efflux sources. Examples of
the first category are the launch vehicle, spacecraft, medium-gain
antenna plug or large pieces that could impact the planet as a result
of trajectory aiming errors, orbital decay, and catastrophic events
during the quarantine period. The second category includes fluids
or particles that consist of a relatively small amount of material
expelled at any time.
The spacecraft portion of the model is considered in more detail in
Fig. 3. The numbers under each source are the prelaunch alloca-
tions.
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The "trajectory aiming and delivery errors" source considers the
accidental impact of the spacecraft as a result of injection, orbit
determination, and maneuver execution errors and subsequent
delivery dispersions during the heliocentric and areocentric phases
of the mission. These probability allocations are met by mission
and navigation strategy, including aiming point and delivery biases.
Catastrophic events that could occur while the spacecraft is in orbit
include spacecraft disintegration by explosion and uncontrolled
spin. The probability of contamination by spacecraft disintegratior.
was analytically determined by calculating the probability that an
explosion or uncontrolled spin would occur and that the event would
result in placing a large equipment item into a decaying orbit or
impact trajectory.
There are three major ejecta efflux sources: propellant, debris,
and continuous. Debris ejects, including loose particles, is the
principal contamination source; thus the largest suballocation is
given to it. All of these sources were analyzed in detail. The prob-
ability values that were used in the calculations are summarized in
Table 1. The estimate for the number of organisms in or on a
given ejecta efflux source is dependent on the source that is being
analyzed. For example, the item of interest for the debris ejecta
is the number of organisms on the exposed surface of the spacecraft,
whereas for the gas efflux an estimate of the number of organisms
in the on-board nitrogen gas bottles is appropriate. The probability
of ejection PE of a single microorganism and the probability PT,
that the organism is placed on an impact trajectory are also source
t
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dependent. An example of the manner in which these sourk;;e dependent
parameters were estimated is shown in Fig. 4 for meteoroid spall.
The estimate corresponds to the largest value of P E X PT over the
expected range of ejecta size and density.
The probability that an organism will survive ejection is assumed to
be 1.0 for those ejection processes involving cold release. Orga-
nisms released through meteoroid impact are subjected to some
heat. Consequently, using engineering judgment, the estimate for
meteoroids is 0. 5.
The probability of survival of a microorganism in the space environ-
ment was a difficult parameter to estimate because none of the
studies in the literature could be directly related to the Mariner
Mars 1971 mission conditions. The probability of survival value is
assumed to be a function of the amount of time the particle is ex-
posed to the environment after release from the spacecraft. The
environmental exposure, whether during the heliocentric or areo-
centric portions of the mission, will be for a minimum of several
days and may extend for months. Based on the results of ultra-
violet (UV) experiments in published literature, the time of expected
exposure, conferences with experts in the field, and engineering
judgment relative to the protection afforded by material surrounding
an organism, the probability of survival was estimated to be
1 X 10-3.
The probability that a microorganism will survive atmospheric entry
depends upon the size and emissivity of the particle on which it
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resides. Particles that encounter the atmosphere will do so at
relatively high velocities. Dependent upon particle parameters,
temperatures sufficient to produce sterilization could be achieved.
An estimate of 1 X 10 -2 , based on engineering judgment, was
selected.
The probability of release was assumed to be 1.0. The probability
of growth was given a value of 1 X 10 -4 by directive from the NASA
Planetary Quarantine Office in accordance with the recommendations
of the Space Science Board.
The principal hazards from a planetary contamination standpoint are
spacecraft impact, debris ejects, and attitude control and pressurant
gas efflux. During the heliocentric portion of the mission, maneu-
vers are performed in such a fashion that the probability estimates
are within the probability allocations for spacecraft accidental
impact events. For the areocentric portion of the mission, the
orbit is chosen with a periapsis altitude such that the spacecraft will
remain in orbit (Fig. 5), even after mission completion, for much
more than the duration of the period of biological exploration, which
for Mars is defined as being through January 1, 1989, 17 years
after insertion. Debris ejecta, including loose particles released
by spacecraft dynamic events or meteoroid impact, are a hazard
near encounter and during the areocentric portion of the mission.
To meet the planetary quarantine constraint for this source, the
spacecraft was carefully cleaned prior to launch. The attitude con-
trol and pressurant gases are a potential principal hazard.
p
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However, during the filling process for Mariner Mars 1971, the
gases are filtered through 0. 5 µ filters into precleaned tanks.
Microbial Burden Control and Estimation
Based on the planetary quarantine analysis, an upper permissible
microbial burden level was established for the spacecraft at the time
it was placed within the nose fairing, i. e. , encapsulation. For a
nominal mission, this level was 1 X 105.
To assure that the permissible level would not be exceeded, the
spacecraft were assembled, tested, and encapsulated in Class 100
laminar down-flow teats (Fig. 6); clothing and access restrictions
for personnel were established; and an extensive cleaning program
using isopropyl alcohol on critical spacecraft surfaces was imple-
mented. Microbiological assays (Fig. 7) were taken using the swab
rinse method [4). The United States Public Health Service verified
the assays. The estimated microbial burden on the exposed our-
faces of the Mariner IX spacecraft was 3.1 X 10 4 . This estimate is
the lowest that has been measured on any Mariner spacecraft, indi-
cating the effectiveness of the cleaning and handling program.
Summary	 Z^
Satisfaction of the planetary quarantine requirements by all United
States planetary flight programs enables NASA to assure concerned
organizations that this nation has established biological safeguards
in its planetary programs and that a course is being followed that
will result in the planets being maintained as biological preserves
for scientific investigations.
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The United States unmanned Mars orbiter project has analyzed the
probability of contaminating Mars with viable terrestrial micro-
organisms carried on or ejected from the launch vehicle or space-
craft. A mathematical model has been constructed to allocate and
to estimate probability of contamination associated with identified
contaminating sources or events. Mission strategy, including aim-
ing point biasing and orbit periapsis altitude selection, was developed
to satisfy the probability allocations for accidental spacecraft
impact. To assure that permissible microbial burden levels wo ,:,a
not be exceeded, extensive cleaning and facility personnel control
programs were implemented. The analysis and microbiological
assay results indicate that the planetary quarantine constraints for
the orbiter mission are being satisfied.
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Table 1. Probability values
Parameter	 Estimate	 Informetion source
Number of organisms
	
Source dependent	 Encapsulation bioassay,
expected dieoff
Probability of ejection	 Source dependent	 ---
Probability of surviving 	 1.0	 Engineering judgment
ejection's
Probability of impact	 Source dependent	 ---
Probability of surviving	 1 X 10 -3	UV experiments in literature
space environment
Probability of surviving
	
1 X 10 -2
	Engineering judgment
atmospheric entry
Probability of release	 1.0	 ---
Probability of growth	 1 X 10 -4	NASA directive
`With meteoro-d bombardment, 5 X 10-1.
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